

#brandeilig

Report no. 1



Background to mosque attacks in 2018

Publisher

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Initiative **#brandeilig**

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Preface

#brandeilig is Germany's first reporting centre for attacks on mosques. Our goal is to collect and provide access to as much information as possible on mosque attacks, to ensure systematic recording, and to highlighting the dimensions and the impact of these attacks on affected individuals.

#brandeilig is principally characterized by its proximity and contact with mosque communities affected by attacks. We talk to the board members and visit the mosques in person. We offer counselling opportunities to affected persons of attacks and assaults, show solidarity and try not to leave communities alone. In this respect, #brandeilig offers more than just statistical recording.

As #brandilig, we recorded 768 mosque attacks in Germany between January 2014 and June 2021. The number of unreported cases is much higher. There is often hardly any awareness of the seriousness of the situation across society. On the contrary: the populist right-wing in Germany's party-political landscape is strengthening, and non-parliamentary extreme right-wing and Islamophobic groups are also a cause for concern. The consistently high number of mosque attacks does not receive the necessary public attention. Attacks on mosques threaten not only community life, but also the freedom of religion as guaranteed in the constitution. They aim to endanger the peaceful coexistence of the citizens of this country. In addition, there is also a lack of public attention, so mosque attacks or at-

tacks against women wearing headscarves and those who are perceived to be Muslim are hardly re-reported. As the first reporting office in Germany, we would like to raise awareness of these issues and close the existing information gap regarding mosque attacks.

This annual report is a first step in this direction. Based on the attacks registered in 2018, we used a questionnaire to conduct interviews with representatives of the affected mosque communities. The results are summarized in the following chapters.

As part of the #brandeilig initiative, FAIR international - Federation against Injustice and Racism e. V. (FAIR) has entered into cooperation with various Islamic religious communities. They facilitated our access to the affected communities and were always available to advise us.

These include the members of the Coordination Council of Muslims (KRM), and in particular the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (Islam Council), the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG) and the Turkish Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion (DITIB). During the study period, the mosques belonging to these communities were most frequently affected by attacks. The circle of supporters also includes the Schura Schleswig-Holstein, the Schura Bremen, the Schura Lower Saxony, the Schura Rhineland-Palatinate and the Schura Hamburg. We would like to thank them all for their support and cooperation.



1. Introduction

FAIR international - Federation against Injustice and Racism e. V. is an anti-discrimination association based in Cologne, which represents the interests of disadvantaged persons or groups of persons. The focus of the association is to work against discrimination based on ethnic origin and religion.

The aim is to provide comprehensive support for those affected and their families, to raise awareness of racism and discrimination in society and politics, and to develop strategies for reducing racism and discrimination in society as a whole.

#brandeilig is an initiative of FAIR and aims to draw attention to mosque attacks. For this purpose, mosque attacks are recorded and background information on the crime sequences, the investigation and, if applicable, court proceedings, and the extent of the damage caused is collected and published. This is intended to close the gap of a systematic and specific recording¹ of mosque attacks and to make clear the dimension of the danger for the approximately 2,400 mosques and their visitors in Germany.

As of July 1, 2019, the information obtained is published on the website www.brandeilig.org. In addition to the statistical coverage of mosque attacks from 2014 onwards, the website publishes guest articles on the topic by academics, journalists, and politicians.

Moreover, #brandeilig offers consultations for mosques, helping them to act properly in the event of a mosque attack or to manage the situation appropriately. In this sense, attacks have been reported and made public in the past that would otherwise have gone unnoticed.

The data obtained will help to raise awareness of the issue and will be summarized and published as annual reports. As such, they provide a basis for religious communities, politicians, authorities and the public to work out possible security measures for mosques and Muslims in general. In addition, the reports provide a basis for further scientific research. For this purpose, standardized interviews will be conducted with board members of mosques attacked during the year under study, and the information obtained will be analysed.

This 2018 Annual Report is the first publication in this series and will be continued in the future.

Summary of the results from the telephone interviews

In 2018, #brandeilig recorded a total of 120 mosque attacks. The present results are based on 68 telephone interviews with mosque communities that were the target of one or more

¹ Since 2017, Islamophobic crimes have been recorded separately within the scope of the thematic field catalogue of politically motivated crime (PMK).

attacks in 2018. The interviews were conducted during 2020. The following results are only an excerpt and will be explained in more detail later in this report.

In general, the clearance rate for mosque attacks can be considered as very low. Suspects could only be identified in a total of 9 cases. Most attacks on mosques have taken place in the German states of Bavaria (25 attacks/21%) and North Rhine-Westphalia (23 attacks/19%). Most of the mosques affected were those belonging to DITIB and IGMG/Islam Council. Around half of the respondents (48%) said they had already been attacked in the past and had not reported it to the police.

The most frequent incidents can be assigned to the field of “right-wing extremism” (45%). In addition, there are cases that can be counted in the area of “foreign ideology” (13%) and cases with a foreign connection (13%).² All attacks attributed to a foreign ideology included “PKK slogans.” It cannot be ruled out that foreign ideology played a role in the attacks in which a foreign connection could be established. A concrete, political motivation for the crime could not be determined behind all the mosque attacks.

With regard to the crime sequence, in 38/120 or 32% of the cases, the mosques were smeared with political slogans or symbols. In addition, nine arson attacks were carried

out on various mosques, injuring two people. Two arson attacks have since resulted in prison sentences for attempted murder. According to media reports, two other people were injured by air force guns.

47% of the damage occurred in the outer area of the mosques due to physical violence.

54% of the surveyed communities have taken security measures after an attack, such as installing video cameras. However, many communities have also expressed concerns due to legal regulations and have refrained from installing surveillance cameras.

77% of those affected repaired the damage with their own funds because the insurance companies did not cover the costs. In rare cases, the cost of repairs was covered by the insurance company. After an attack, the insurance contract was terminated or the threat of termination was made in the event of another incident.

According to the information provided by the respondents, the total cost that had to be raised to eliminate the property damage incurred in 2018 is about € 211,000. In order to save costs, many communities have had to forgo an expert or a specialist. According to the interviewed mosques’ board members, the total costs would have been much higher, if the damage had been repaired by professional contractors.

² For explanations of the terms “foreign ideology” and “foreign connection” see page 16.



Almost every other affected mosque (48%) has already been attacked several times, according to their chairperson. Physical force was used in every second attack (47%).

Almost half of all attacked mosque communities have received expressions of solidarity from other mosque communities, indicating a high level of intra-Muslim solidarity. Furthermore, respondents indicated that Turkish consulates had shown more presence and solidarity than politicians and representatives of public domestic authorities. Local politicians participated in only 10 of the 68 cases interviewed.

The contact and subsequent cooperation with the security authorities, on the other hand, turned out to be positive, apart from a few negative experiences. In general, the police officers arrived on the scene very quickly and immediately started the investigation. Nevertheless, almost none of the incidents could be solved until today. In light of the fact that nearly in 20 attacks the injury or death of people was accepted or threatened, this rate is a cause for concern.

2. Methodology and procedure for recording

Working definitions and infrastructures for information acquisition and processing were developed for the systematic recording of mosque attacks and the compilation of reports. These will be briefly presented below.

2.1 Working definition “Mosque attack”

Under a mosque attack, we include all attacks on facilities used by Muslims for the purpose of directly practising their religion or assumed to be such by perpetrators. This includes premises, property, or events that have a legal or factual connection to such a facility (libraries, event spaces, housing units, youth facilities, vehicles, trash receptacles, outdoor activities, etc.). We consider any attack on a mosque to be Islamophobic. If political or ideological symbols such as a swastika are left at the scene of the crime, then such are included as a subcategory of “right-wing extremist” to Islamophobia.

An attack is understood to be any intentional or unintentional threat to legally protected interests through human behaviour. We also consider threatening letters or even bomb threats to be an “attack”. Certain threats are categorized by the legislature as “endangerment offences” and are considered criminal offences punishable by imprisonment (cf. Section 241 of the German Criminal Code).

2.2 Information gathering

Information on mosque attacks is gathered primarily from three sources.

For the #brandeilig initiative, cooperation partnerships were entered into with various Islamic religious communities. This has created a broad infrastructure through which mosque attacks are reported, background information is collected, and standardized telephone interviews are then conducted with mosque boards. Local and national news media, as well as notifications from social networks, serve as additional sources. By conducting follow-up research, for example by contacting the mosque community concerned directly, the reports of mosque attacks recorded in the media are checked for accuracy and subsequently documented.

The Federal Government’s answers to the parliamentary minor questions on the topic of Islamophobia serve as further sources. On a quarterly basis, mosque attacks reported to the Federal Criminal Police Office are listed there, which have been classified under a certain (politically motivated) category. These cases are included in the statistics as a supplement if they are not already available.

2.3 Standardized questionnaire and telephone interviews with affected persons

A standardized questionnaire was created especially for the telephone interviews in consultation with scientists and lawyers. In it, community members are asked for general information about the mosque, details about the manner of the attack, the damage caused, the status of

the investigation, and any reactions or expressions of solidarity from civil society and politics. In addition, questions were asked about perceptions of safety and the extent to which the attacks affect feelings of social acceptance. The information obtained from this is recorded using statistical software.

In addition, the survey is intended to provide evidence for further research on the topic of “anti-Muslim racism” in Germany.

2.4 Inquiry

In total, we were able to contact 92 of 120 attacked mosques by phone during our survey. When cross-referenced with the Bundestag printed papers,³ 28 affected mosques could not be identified or reached. More detailed information about the mosques themselves, such as the name, was not given there, which is why we could not contact them.

Of the 92 mosque attacks that we were able to verify, no interview was conducted with 11 mosque congregations. However, the boards confirmed that their mosques had been attacked in the year of investigation. Finally, 13 communities indicated that they could not provide specific information about an incident known to the police. The chairmen of the com-

munities expressed the suspicion that these attacks took place during a demonstration against the mosque. The respective date of the attacks in the Bundestag printed papers speaks for this. On the days in question, demonstrations against the mosques actually took place in some cities, in which, according to Bundestag printed papers, there were also attacks against them. These incidents were included in the count. Further, during the interviews, it was found that 10 mosques were attacked twice during the study period.

Specifically, telephone interviews were conducted with 58 mosque communities that commented on a total of 68 mosque attacks in 2018. A separate questionnaire was completed for each mosque attack. The population refers to the number of completed questionnaires and is N=68. The results presented in the following chapters are based on the answers given in the interviews. occasionally, multiple answers were given, namely when several offences were fulfilled at the same time. This was the case, for example, if there was a racist insult or threat in addition to the damage to property.

For data protection reasons, the names of the mosques that participated in the surveys are not disclosed.

³ Bundestag Printed Papers No 19/8854, Web: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/088/1908854.pdf>

3. Statistical overall view for 2018

In this chapter, the mosque attacks from 2018 are reflected in concrete numbers. In addition to the total number and information on the sequence of the crime, other key data on the incidents are listed in tabular form. Table 1 below serves here as an initial overview, which will

be further referred to in the remainder of this paper. We distinguish between the data referring to all registered mosque attacks (N=120) in the mentioned period and the mosque attacks from 2018, for which interviews were conducted with the affected mosque boards (N=68).

Total mosque attacks	2018	
Number of registered attacks	120	
Number of interviews conducted	68	
Attacks by state (total and interviews conducted)	N=120	N=68
NW - North Rhine-Westphalia	23	15
BY - Bavaria	25	11
NI - Lower Saxony	14	11
BE - Berlin	10	8
BW - Baden-Württemberg	12	5
HE - Hesse	8	5
RP - Rhineland Palatinate	6	4
ST - Saxony-Anhalt	6	3
SN - Saxony	4	2
SH - Schleswig-Holstein	2	1
HB - Bremen	1	1
TH - Thuringia	5	1
HH - Hamburg	3	1
MV - Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	1	0
BB - Brandenburg	0	0
SL - Saarland	0	0

Assignment to umbrella organizations and other communities (interview partners)	N=68
Turkish Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion (DITIB)	40
Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG)/Islam Council	15
Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist Associations in Germany (ADÜTDF)	3
German speaking Muslim community	2
Central Council of Muslims (ZMD)	3
Umbrella organization of Islamic communities Saxony-Anhalt	2
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (AMJ)	1
Nizam-ı Alem Dergahı	1
Without umbrella organization	1
Total crime motivation ⁴	N=120
Right-wing extremist	54
Foreign ideology	15
Foreign connection	16
Not concretely assignable	28
Racial	7
Crime sequence - total type of attack (incl. multiple answers)	N=120
Vandalism/Damage to property	17
Vandalism/Smearing	30
Vandalism/Swastika smearing	10
Vandalism/Animal carcass	1
Incitement to hatred	21
Arson attack	9
Insult	7
Threat	7
Insulting confessions, religious communities and ideological associations	3

⁴ It can be assumed that all of these attacks are also Islamophobic crimes, because the targets of the attack are mosques,

Other	4
Shooting with an air gun	3
Trespass	3
Interference of religious practice	3
Disturbing the public peace by threatening to commit a crime	1
Physical injury	1
Crime sequence - type of attack interview partners (incl. multiple answers)	N=68
Vandalism/Smearing	30
Vandalism/Damage to property	21
Arson attack	8
Threat	5
Insult	5
Other	3
Insulting confessions, religious communities and ideological associations	3
Vandalism/Animal carcass	3
Disruption of religious practice	1
Disturbing the public peace by threatening to commit a crime	1
Expressions of solidarity (incl. multiple answers)	N= 68
From other mosque communities	32
From the neighbourhood	18
From the consulate or embassy	18
From the mayor	15
From NGOs	13
From politicians	10
From others	11

Press	N=68
Mosque communities issued a press release after an attack.	17 (25%)
Mosque communities have not issued press releases after an attack.	49 (72%)
Third parties outside the communities have approached the press after an attack.	15 (22%)
The attack was reported in mass media.	31 (45%)
The attack was not reported in any mass media.	35 (51%)
Information on the investigation status	N=68
Police were informed, charges filed	66
Police were not informed	2
Suspects were not identified in ... cases	58
Suspects were identified in ... cases	7
Suspects identified; charges not filed in ... cases	3
Suspects identified; charges filed in ... cases	4
Court decision is available in ... cases	2

Table 1

3.1 Overview

Using the methodology described earlier, 120 mosque attacks were recorded and verified for 2018.⁵

Looking at the type of crime⁶, vandalism was committed in 56 of the attacks. Another 21 cases were registered as incitement of hatred,

including Islamophobic statements uttered at demonstrations against the construction of mosques. Nine mosques were severely damaged by an arson attack. In seven cases, communities were insulted and threatened with violence, for example through letters. In addition, unconstitutional symbols such as swastikas were smeared on the facades of the mosques. One-fifth of all cases occurred in Bavaria

⁵ The reason for choosing this year as the study period is that all the information was available for this year. Information on subsequent reports of the figures from the Federal Criminal Police Office were also available, so that a resilient density of information was available.

⁶ More detailed information on the crime sequence can be found in chapter 4 in the case examples or on the website www.brandeilig.org.



Almost half of the attacks (46%) are perpetrated by right-wing extremists.

(21%) and North Rhine-Westphalia (19%), and about one-tenth in Lower Saxony (12%) and Baden-Württemberg (10%). The fewest attacks occurred in Bremen and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (1 attack each). According to our records, there were no attacks in Brandenburg and Saarland.

3.2 Motivation for the crime

The characteristics of an attack include not only the manner in which it is carried out but also the underlying political orientation of the motivation for the crime. What prompts the perpetrators to smear mosques and threaten their communities, break windows and doors, or even set fire to them?

It is not always possible to clearly determine the motive for the crime. Some perpetrators leave traces and clues that reveal a certain motivation, or they even want to spread a certain message or political slogans. If, for example, a mosque is smeared with swastikas and other “right-wing” symbols such as “88”, these are clear indications. In such a case, one can assume a right-wing extremist background.

The assignment becomes more difficult when less clear symbols are left at the crime scene. In such cases, it is important to pay attention to the context. In many cases, for example, a

foreign connection can be identified. We distinguish between “foreign connection” and the Federal Criminal Police Office category “foreign ideology.” If, for example, a letter of confession is available and a group affiliation is identifiable, the offences are assigned to the “foreign ideology” category. According to the Federal Criminal Police Office, the category includes “separatist, right-wing and left-wing ideologies originating from abroad, i.e., all foreign non-religious ideologies.”⁷ In distinction to this, we classify cases under “foreign connection” if a corresponding group affiliation could not be proven at the time of the survey or if there are no reliable reports in this regard.

Nevertheless, based on the information available in the media, the printed papers of the Bundestag, the information provided by representatives of mosque communities, and not least on the basis of our own research, certain crime motivations can be assigned to most of the recorded attacks. However, this is subject to more recent findings.

In the case of some attacks, more than one motive is possible, taking into account the circumstances of the crime. Apart from this, however, it should be emphasized that due to the symbolic target of an attack such as a mosque, an act motivated by Islamophobia cannot be ruled out per se and therefore always plays a role.

⁷ Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)- Politically Motivated Crime - Foreign Ideology - Web: https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Deliktsbereiche/PMK/PMKAI/PMKAI_node.html (15.04.2022)

As can be seen in Table 1, almost half of all incidents (54 or 45%) can be specifically assigned to the right-wing spectrum. In 15 cases, content can be identified that clearly points to a foreign ideology or group. Based on the circumstances of the attacks (writings, smearing, confession letters), these attacks can be attributed to the terrorist organization PKK. Among these are also attacks in which reference is made to the conflict in Syria through smearing such as "PYD". 16 cases appear to have a foreign connection, as there are indications of a conflictual situation abroad without sufficient indications for an undoubted attribution to a specific foreign ideology. It cannot be ruled out that some of these 16 attacks also have a foreign ideology as a motive for the crime.⁸

In addition, 28 other incidents could not be attributed to a specific political motivation, which is why they are included in the statistics under

"Not assignable". This includes, for example, various property damage offences, smearing and light projections with slogans on a mosque building. In these cases, no clear indications of a specific motive were recognizable at the respective crime scenes. Therefore a concrete assignment to a specific political motivation was refrained from.

In addition, there are 7 cases in which clearly racist vocabulary or symbolism was used. This includes, for example, placing a pig's head in front of a mosque as happened in Gronau. These may be motivated by right-wing extremism. However, there were no clear indications of right-wing extremist sentiments at the time of the crime in order to classify it as a right-wing extremist. However, this cannot be ruled out.

The above figures above refer to the total statistics of the 120 attacks.

⁸ Some of these attacks can be assigned to the time of the Turkish military operation in northern Syria (01/20/2018 - 03/18/2018). Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that some of them could have been acts of revenge against the military operations in northern Syria. Mosque attacks also took place during the same period, during which the word Afrin was smeared alongside the words PKK and PYD. See as an example <https://brandeilig.org/schmiererei-an-moschee-in-am-berg/>)

4. Crime sequence with case examples⁹


Mosque attacks have different manifestations. In addition to smearing, arson attacks and property damage, there are often threats and insults to the mosques and their members.

For the comprehensive list of attacks on mosques, legal definitions of the following facts were used and applied to the mosque attacks. Real-life case examples registered as part of the initiative also follow. Our interview partners were affected by one or more of the offences described here. The case studies

and statistics discussed in this chapter refer to the interviews conducted with the chairmen of the mosques (N=68)

4.1. Arson

Arson is referred to in Section 306 (Section 241 of the German Criminal Code) of the Criminal Code and aggravated arson in Section 306a (Section 241 of the German Criminal Code). Sec. 306 of the German Criminal Code includes setting fire and the complete or partially destruction caused by setting fire.¹⁰



⁹ For data protection reasons, the names of the affected mosques are not mentioned.

¹⁰ Fischer, Thomas, „Becksche Kurz-Kommentare“, German Criminal Code with supplementary laws, Volume 10, 65. edition, Munich 2018, Fischer, Sec. 306 marginal no. 13.



One in ten mosques has been severely damaged by an arson attack.

Nearly 12% of the representatives of attacked mosques report arson with sometimes very high property damage. Some involved home-made Molotov cocktails thrown through the windows into the building or against the facade. It is not uncommon for mosques to be inhabited by an imam and his family, or for the mosque to be located in a residential block or in its immediate vicinity, so that the suspects accept the injury or death of the people living there. Particularly serious arsons occurred in the year under review in Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, and Hesse, for example. Further details on these cases can be found on our website.

Case example 1: An arson attack is carried out on a mosque in Baden-Württemberg. Video footage from the surveillance cameras clearly shows three youths throwing Molotov cocktails at the mosque building. The perpetrators were arrested and charged. The defendants claim that the motive for the crime was a reaction to the Turkish military operation in Afrin, Syria.

4.2. Threat

Threatening is regulated in Sec. 241 of the German Criminal Code. A threat is to affirm, when there is the prospect of an evil that is intended

to give the threatened person the impression of seriousness and is also objective suitable for this purpose.¹¹ These include numerous bomb threats by e-mail or letter and the sending of letters with intimidating and derogatory content that regularly reach mosques. 7% of the interviewees stated this fact.

Case example 2: In November 2018, a mosque in Lower Saxony receives a letter with death threats. The police assume Islamophobic and racist motives.

Case example 3: In May 2018, three people walk into a mosque in Thuringia and become violent. They attack people present, issue death threats and insults. No one is seriously injured, and no property damage occurs in the mosque. However, the chairman of the community speaks of “psychological damage”. The case is assigned to the field of “right-wing” by the Federal Criminal Police Office.

4.3. Insult

Insult is a criminal offence under Section 185 of the German Criminal Code and involves the intentional announcement of disrespect or disregard for the honour of another¹² In the context of our recording, this includes in particular letters or e-mails addressed to mosque communities and associations that denigrate

¹¹ Naumburg StraFo 13, P. 214 in: Fischer, Thomas, „Becksche Kurz-Kommentare“, German Criminal Code with supplementary laws, Volume 10, 65. edition, Munich 2018.

¹² BGHSt 1, 288.



Almost every other mosque (44%) was smeared with political slogans.

the association or religion. In 2018, 7% of the surveyed communities were affected.

Case example 4: A mosque in Berlin had received a letter with threats and insulting slogans.

4.4. Vandalism

Within the statistical recording, cases of damage to property or common damage to property are subsumed under vandalism (with additional characteristics such as smearing, animal carcasses, etc.). This includes the willful destruction of or damage to the exterior facade, windows, entrance doors, or other objects and components of a mosque dedicated to worship, or an associated space on the premises of the mosque (cf. Sections 303, 304 of the German Criminal Code).

Almost one in four mosque communities (24%) was affected by vandalism. Respondents reported various property damage offences, such as broken windows or other damage to the building. 44% of those affected by vandalism said that their mosque had been smeared. Some have reported political slogans or symbolic colours that can be attributed to specific extremist organizations.

Smearing is categorised mostly under property damage and includes soiling or leaving graffiti on the exterior walls of the mosque or other as-

sociated parts of the building (cf. Section 303 of the German Criminal Code), usually with an Islamophobic, political or racist message.

Case example 5: In January 2018, a mosque in North Rhine-Westphalia becomes the target of vandalism. The facade is smeared with the words “Afrin” and “İntikam” (Turkish for “revenge”) and the windows are smashed. Video footage from the mosque’s security camera shows unknown men entering the mosque grounds with three bags in their hands, first smearing the walls with the colours red, green, and yellow, and then smashing the windows with large rocks. In this case, the police assume that they are probably PKK sympathizers.

4.5. Use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations

Based on Sections 86, 86a of the German Criminal Code, this category covers the use of signs belonging to organizations that are considered unconstitutional.

In particular, signs that refer to National Socialism, such as swastikas and other symbols placed on the exterior facade of a mosque, for example, are considered to be a mosque attack with an extreme right-wing message.

Case example 6: In Saxony-Anhalt in March 2018, the interior facade of a mosque is smeared with swastikas and the inscription “ACAB” (En-

glish acronym for: “All Cops Are Bastards”). The smearing took place while community members were performing noon prayers. In the camera footage, a woman wearing a blue jacket is seen entering the mosque. The case is assigned to the field of “right-wing”.

4.6. Other¹³

Cases that cannot be fully assigned to the above categories have been included under the “Other” category. For example, in Bavaria, crosses were placed on the construction site of a mosque. On the crosses were placed names of cities where terrorist attacks were carried out. In another city in Bavaria, a cardboard figure in the shape of a pig was placed

on the construction site of the mosque. On it was written: “SCHWEINEREI am VOLK vorbei” roughly translated as “PIGGISHNESS away the PEOPLE”.

The overall picture shows that in 84% of the cases, violent crimes of varying degrees were committed, resulting in large-scale property damage. In some cases, the premises were no longer usable and religious activities or educational programs could not be held at times. Other community members reported receiving threats and also reported receiving abusive letters and messages. 4% testified that animal limbs from pigs were left on their mosque grounds. The communities stated to consider this an insult and provocation in the interview.

¹³ Further information on the case examples mentioned here and others, also beyond 2018, can be viewed on the website www.brandeilig.org, with additional information and images.

5. Damage incurred

Mosque attacks 2018: Were there any people on the premises of the mosque during the attack?	N=68
no	54
I do not know	3
Yes; not injured	9
Yes injured	2

Table 2

Different forms of attacks leave different damage to mosques, the community, and both common and social life. In addition to asking about material damage and any people injured, we wanted to know to what extent an attack had affected perceptions of safety. Corresponding questions were integrated into the questionnaire.

5.1. Personal injury and perception of safety

First, it was asked whether people were present inside the mosque during the mosque attacks and whether there was any personal injury.

In 54 mosque attacks (79%), respondents reported that no people were present in the mosque during the attack. Mostly this was due to the fact that the attacks mainly took place after the night prayers and the community had already left the mosque. In some cases, however, the imam was in the mosque or lived in close vicinity to it. It is common for mosques to be located within an apartment

block or in close vicinity to other apartments and houses. It can therefore be assumed that the perpetrators were prepared to accept the possibility of personal injury.

Two people were injured in 11 mosque attacks with people present at the time of the attack. The type of attack was arson. There were no people injured in the rest of the attacks.

It was further asked how the attacks have affected the community's **perception of safety**. The persons interviewed were asked to rate their perception of safety on a scale from 1-7. 1 stands for "not at all threatened" and 7 for "very threatened". Here it must be emphasized that only the chairman of the respective community was interviewed per attack. The community chairman ranked the community members' perception of safety on a scale according to his subjective feelings.

46% of respondents said they felt somewhat threatened (scale 3-5). 55% of respondents answered with: "Community members don't feel threatened at all." (Scale 1-2). None of

them marked the 7 with a cross. Only a few indicated 6. This means that no community felt very vulnerable or threatened after an attack. However, this result equally suggests that community members do not want to be intimidated by the attacks.

5.2. Material damages

Much of the material damage was caused by arson attacks, smearing and damage to property. Interviews have indicated that the total financial impact is in the six-figure range.


It should be noted that most of the damage occurred in the outer area of the mosque. 47 mosque communities (69%) stated that most

of the damage was to the outer walls or facades of the mosque (29 cases). Further damage occurred to the windows (16 cases) and doors (13 cases). In rare cases, there was also damage to the interior of the mosque, such as when objects were thrown through the windows. Four mosques were affected by property damage in the front yard of the mosques or associated containers and street signs.

About a quarter (18 cases) of the mosque board members interviewed said that no property damage resulted from the attacks because they were rather verbal, such as threats of violence, or insulting and abusive messages that were left. In this respect, not all of the mosques surveyed were affected by concrete

Property damage	N=68
Damage to the outer area of the mosque	47
Damage to the interior of the mosque	3
No property damage has occurred	18

Table 3





More than half of the mosque communities (54%) have independently taken security measures after an attack.

property damage. The remaining mosques were unable to provide precise information on any damage. Some of the respondents also assume that existing security measures, such as cameras, would have prevented greater damage to the interior and outside areas, as it was presumably important for many perpetrators to be able to flee quickly.

Only half of the damaged mosques were fully usable immediately after the attack. The period in which a damaged mosque could no longer be used varies and ranges from one day to six months. 15% said it only took a day before they could be used again. Again in 15% of the cases, the premises could no longer be used for up to 6 months. In one case, the prayer room was so damaged that the imam had to perform prayers with the community in a tent. The same community was later forced to move to a new building, which involved very high costs and had to be covered by donations.

In terms of **financial impact**, the majority (77%) of the mosque communities affected stated that they had repaired the damage themselves because insurance companies did not cover the costs. Accordingly, the repair of most of the property damage had to be financed by donations. Only in one-fifth

of the cases (19%) did the insurance company cover the costs. In one case, an affected community had its contract terminated by the insurance company.

It should be emphasized that the damage caused was repaired in most cases by the communities from their own funds and on their own initiative. “We simply took paint we still had in the basement and painted over the damaged area to save costs.” In 2018, the communities surveyed raised approximately **€ 211,230.00** in this way to repair the damage. If a specialist had been called in and the damage had been professionally repaired, the costs would have been much higher, some of the community chairmen pointed out during the discussion.

5.3. Security measures

Although 55% of respondents say they do not feel threatened at all, we can see that at least as many mosques have taken security measures.

In 37 (54%) cases, additional security measures were taken after an attack (Fig. 5). This was not the case in 27 (40%) communities. Of those that took additional security measures, 21 communities installed surveillance

cameras, 9 reported post-attack vigils, and only one mosque installed an alarm system. 11 resorted to other measures, such as additional checks on doors and windows, or setting up WhatsApp groups to keep each other informed. Some of the respondents also men-

tioned that the installation of a security system was not easy to implement because filming was only allowed from certain perspectives. Consequently, the decision was made not to do it in such cases.

Security measures after the attack*




Figure 3




Figure 4

*Details in case numbers

6. Visitor numbers and expressions of solidarity

It also examined how the attacks have affected communities. Specifically, the question was asked whether the number of visitors had changed and whether there had been expressions of solidarity after an attack and from whom.

It was found that the number of visitors remained the same in most cases (82%) after the attacks. In 12% of the cases the number of visitors increased and in only 4% of the cases they decreased.

Regarding expressions of solidarity (Table 1), about half of the interviewed boards of the attacked mosques indicated that they had received expressions of solidarity from other mosque communities (32/68). In 18 cases, respondents indicated that neighbours showed solidarity with the community. In just as many cases, it was stated under the category "Other" that representatives of the regional Turkish consulates had expressed solidarity with the communities. In about one in five attacks, the mayor (15) visited the community or solidarity was expressed by local NGOs (13). Half (52%) of the respondents indicated that expressions of solidarity had taken place in the form of a personal visit. About one-fifth had solidarity through calls.

In the 2018 survey year, only two mosque communities reported receiving a statement of solidarity from a church. A demonstration was held in the small town of Nordenham, where about 900 people participated and provided assistance.¹⁴ The great attention has motivated the mosques very much.

Apart from that, the communities received messages on social networks and also supportive emails and letters. Although around 45% of the attacks were reported in the press and the incidents had thus become known, comparatively few local politicians showed solidarity. Only in 10 cases did local politicians participate.

Through the solidarity messages, the mosques and their members did not feel alone. The chairpersons reported that these messages of solidarity have strengthened the sense of cohesion and this has been good for the community. However, this was not explicitly measured using a scale. These assessments are based on additional comments from respondents. A high degree of internal solidarity can also be observed. Accordingly, most interest comes from foreign representatives and Islamic religious communities. German politicians and

¹⁴ https://www.nwzonline.de/wesermarsch/blaulicht/nordenham-verbrechen-in-nordenham-moschee-anschlag-bleibt-unaufgeklaert_a_50,5,3857763716.html

church representatives showed comparatively little interest in and solidarity with the affected communities.

The next question was whether the community felt excluded from society after the attack (Figure 5). In 84% of cases, the question was answered in the negative, and in 12% of cases people said they felt excluded from society. In the latter case, it was emphasized that the police had shown little or hardly any interest and, for example, simply tore down Islamophobic posters in a trivializing manner. In some cases, police would have shown little empathy, and statements such as “calm down, this is only the first attack” were also reported to have occurred. All communities that said they felt socially excluded reported problems with the police during investigations. However, those mosque communities that said they did not

feel excluded reported positive experiences with the authorities or police. This suggests that the behaviour of the authorities and security forces may be related to the communities’ sense of belonging.

When asked whether the mosque had previously been the target of an attack, around half answered “yes” and the other half “no” (48% each). The remaining respondents were unable to provide precise information in this regard.

Some mosques also indicated that they did not notify the police the first time, but only when the attacks became more frequent. This underscores the assumption that there were actually more attacks than were ultimately documented by us or other agencies. The number of unreported cases is therefore probably much higher than assumed.

Question: Did you feel excluded from society after the attack? (in %)





Figure 5

7. Press coverage



The response of the regional press (Fig. 6) to an attack was also investigated. It was found that 72% of community members did not contact the press immediately after an attack or even publicly report the incident themselves. External persons who do not directly belong to the affected mosque or were not commissioned by the community passed on the incident to the media in 22% of cases, or published them on social networks, for example. Community members did these themselves 25% of the time. Half of the attacks received no media attention. These results indicate a high level of reluctance on the part of those affected to en-

gage with the local press.

According to statements by mosque boards, the greatest attention to the cases came from the non-German-language press. The reason for this may be a possible lack of interest in the incidents on the part of the German-language press, as well as the fact that information about mosque attacks is not always passed on to the German-language press. As far as media processing and communication are concerned, there seems to be a general need for both sides to catch up. However, there is still a need for research in this respect.

8. Cooperation with investigative authorities

In the next step, the interviewed mosque boards were asked about their cooperation with the authorities. We also wanted to know to what extent they had been informed of ongoing investigations.

In 66 cases, it was indicated that the attacks had been reported. 2 cases were not reported to the police. On the one hand, there was the impression that the police did not want to deal with such cases comprehensively enough; on the other hand, they did not want to attract unnecessary attention for fear of potential copy-cat offenders.

About every second mosque was visited by the investigating authorities, one-fifth of the mosques received only a letter and in only 6 cases did the police contact them by telephone. Some of the respondents were unable to provide precise information (17%).

Another noteworthy finding is the fact that no suspects could be identified in 59 of 68 cases. This corresponds to a very high ratio of 88%, although some respondents stated that the mosque has a camera, and the faces of the perpetrators were clearly visible. In one case, the act was even recorded by the perpetrators themselves and publicly disseminated on the Internet. Nevertheless, the perpetrators could not be identified by the police.

In 9 cases, it was stated that suspects had been identified. The question of the extent to which the persons concerned were aware of whether charges had been brought against the identified suspects was answered in the affirmative by 5 of the respondents. In the remaining 4 cases, the prosecutor's office had not brought charges against the suspects.

In one of the cases (arson attack) there is now a

Information on the investigation status	N=68
Police were informed; charges filed	66
Police were not informed	2
Suspects were not identified in ... cases	58
Suspects were identified in ... cases	7
Suspects identified; charges not filed in ... cases	3
Suspects identified; charges filed in ... cases	4
Court decision is available in ... cases	2

Table 4



We didn't see any point in informing the police about the attack because we thought that they wouldn't do anything.

court verdict for several perpetrators. The verdict is: Imprisonment without probation. Two people received two-year prison sentences each, two other people received one-year prison sentences each, and one person received a 3-month prison sentences without probation.

Overall, mosque boards rated the efforts of investigating police officers positively, but also saw room for improvement.

On a positive note, some police officers offered to drive by the mosque on a regular basis and occasionally stand guard to ensure the mosque's security. Other mosque boards also reported dealing with them "appropriately."

However, there were also reported cases where mosque representatives felt that police officers did not take the attack seriously or wanted to minimize it. For example, a situation was described in which the police said that there was no emergency vehicle that could pass by, although in this case the police station was only 200 meters away from the mosque that had been attacked. This was a case of arson. At another mosque, there was a death threat. The police had not been able to send anyone there due to a lack of personnel. One mosque representative reported that there were also police officers who tended to look for the suspects within the community's own circle.



The police contacted us themselves and asked us to stand guard for 24 hours.

9. Conclusion and recommendations

With reference to the results of the telephone interviews and the experience we have gained through close supervision in several cases of mosque attacks, the following is intended to formulate summarizing recommendations to mosque communities, politics, police, the public and the media.

To the mosque communities:

General protective measures: It is important to provide mosques with sufficient protection as a matter of principle. Depending on the structural condition, this primarily includes the following precautions:

Mosque communities should have technically flawless, high-resolution surveillance cameras suitable for night-time recordings that film the courtyard and entrance area, as well as the interior of the mosque, around the clock and store the recordings for at least several days, in compliance with data protection guidelines. In addition to the cameras, the installation of motion detectors should be considered. The umbrella organizations of the respective mosques could draw up framework agreements with manufacturers and security companies for this purpose. This would ensure that cameras with sufficient specifications could be purchased and professionally installed at well-negotiated prices.

To avoid major damage in the event of a fire, fire alarms and security doors should be in-

stalled if not already in use. Fire extinguishers should be checked regularly. Also, care should be taken not to place highly combustible materials in front of entrances or indoors in front of windows, (e.g., trash receptacles, used clothing containers, or plants/trees).

As further precautions, communities should check first-floor windows and reinforce them, for example, with grilles to prevent easy entry. Installing safety glass of at least a medium level would reduce the risk of fire spreading to the mosque's interior by breaking windows.

It would also be advisable to apply permanent graffiti protection to the exterior facade up to a height of 2 meters. In case of smearing and paint attacks, this makes it easier to remove the paint and thus avoid repainting.

Automatic lights in the premises, which are switched on and off at certain intervals at night, can deter the perpetrators and thus prevent a possible attack. In addition, for mosques with a front courtyard, a fence at least 1.8 meters high would reduce the extent of property damage that could result, for example, from thrown objects. For larger premises, regular patrols by security personnel are also recommended.

It would also make sense for each mosque to designate a person responsible for security who would regularly review security measures.

In addition, mosque communities should review their insurance policies. It would be beneficial if umbrella organizations negotiated a framework agreement for their mosque communities to ensure that mosques are adequately insured. It should be noted that, if possible, insurance should cover as many types of attack as possible, especially any damage to property caused, for example, by vandalism (smearing, smashed windows, damaged doors, lighted trash containers, littering, etc.) and fires caused by outside interference.

In addition, building security measures such as fire protection and escape routes should be optimized in all mosque communities. Expert opinion should also be sought on existing measures to fill any gaps. Here, too, the state or federal associations could take on a coordinating role.

After an attack: After an attack, it is first important to notify the police promptly and not to enter the building. After the police were notified, the board and their own umbrella organization should be informed about the attack. Community members and eyewitnesses should be asked to prepare a memorial log that addresses the following questions:

- When did it happen? (Date and time)
- Who was involved?
- Where did it happen?
- What happened?
- To whom did it happen?
- How did it happen?
- What motive for the crime is suspected?
- What were the consequences of the incident for the community?

After consultation with the police, evidence such as letters and visual material should be duplicated and stored off-site if possible. In order not to complicate the identification of foreign fingerprints, letters, etc. should not be touched unnecessarily. After taking evidence and with the approval of the police, initially, only people from the board should enter the building and, among other things, take photos and record videos of the premises for the insurance company and also store them externally. Only after that, it can be cleaned up in consultation with the police.

It is very important to cooperate with the police and report the attack. Nevertheless, one should not disregard the legal situation. It is worth checking whether and to what extent emergency personnel are allowed to take computers and files with them, for example. A board member should follow up and know the current status of the investigation.

Relevant bodies such as their own umbrella organizations, #brandeilig and other relevant organizations in the field should be informed about the incident. In addition, the attack should be publicized, such as through a press release or social media. In the face of a criminal offence and the clustered attacks on houses of worship, mosque communities should reconsider their reticence and reach out more to the media.

Recommendation to politicians

The number of mosque attacks is steadily increasing. Mosque communities face multi-dimensional hostility. According to the infor-

mation provided by the investigating police or the statements of the boards of directors of attacked mosques, the spectrum of attackers' ranges from right-wing extremists, Islam haters, and racists to sympathizers of the terrorist organisation PKK. The present study also states that, due to the hostility from various extremist camps, it can be assumed that the potential danger to mosques will continue to exist in the future. If one also takes into account that physical violence was threatened or used in the vast majority of mosque attacks - including arson attacks - it must be assumed that there is a serious danger that could become even more acute. Therefore, politicians must also keep an eye on this problem and actively work to curb this negative development.

Mosque attacks are now receiving attention at the federal level. On the one hand, this can be seen from the regular small questions, primarily from the parliamentary group "Die Linke" (Eng. "The Left"), and their answers by the federal government. The parliamentary group "Bündnis90/Die Grünen" (Eng. "Alliance90/The Greens") also repeatedly raises the issue of the potential danger to mosque communities. The issue is also referred to in speeches by individual members of parliament. It has also been reported in the past that representatives of the Federal Ministry of the Interior have met regularly with representatives of the Islamic religious communities and have raised the issue of mosque attacks.¹⁵ This existing attention at the federal level would have to be followed promptly by concrete steps to sup-

port the mosques. The interviews showed that mosque communities themselves are now doing a lot for their own security, for example by installing surveillance cameras or modernizing existing ones. However, not every mosque is financially able to raise the necessary funds for good security equipment in a timely manner. Therefore, the federal and state governments should be aware of this situation and support these communities with appropriate funds in the necessary places.

Cooperation between the federal government and the states would be of great benefit here. These events should also be open to churches and synagogues, etc. This could enable learning from each other.

Further, party-affiliated foundations could make the safety of houses of worship a focus of their annual events. In this way, it could be ensured that this topic, unaffected by current political interest, continues to receive continuous attention and thus also creates a space in which developments in this area are addressed.

However, every politically responsible person or institution should be aware of the possible consequences of their articulation on the subject of Islam, Muslim life and mosques. These issues have often been the subject of political debate in the past. Some of them were conducted in a negative, sweeping, and criminalizing manner that, taken as a whole, contributed to promoting or solidifying Islamophobic enemy images. In political

¹⁵ "Gemeinsam gegen Islamfeindlichkeit", IslamiQ, 25.10.2016, Web: <https://www.islamiq.de/2016/10/25/gemeinsam-fuer-einen-gesellschaftlichen-zusammenhalt/>

articulation, the impression is often created that a large proportion or even the entirety of Muslims is problematic. Generalizing, accusing, suspicious statements have no place in the standard vocabulary of responsible politicians. Politicians must be made aware that Muslims in Germany are currently among the most discriminated against and that they are exposed to attacks on a daily basis. This is confirmed by various organizations. Minorities, and Muslims in particular, must not be the subject of partisan rhetoric and political profiling to pander to the right-wing milieu.

Much of what has been said for federal policy can and should be implemented in cooperation with state policy. However, there is still insufficient awareness of mosque attacks, especially in state politics. They are hardly ever addressed in parliamentary minor questions. Especially in light of the fact that state politics is closer to mosques than federal politics, this weak interest in mosque attacks is surprising. Also, because these attacks fall directly within the area of responsibility of the state criminal investigation departments, their relevance for state policy becomes particularly clear. State policy should address this problem. The statistics of mosque attacks on www.brandeilig.org clearly show that there is an acute need for action, especially in the large territorial states such as North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Lower Saxony and Bavaria, but also in Berlin. Precisely because state politics is closer to the mosques, it would be necessary for state politicians to show solidarity with the affected mosques after attacks and at the same time send a strong signal.

Local politicians have the shortest route to the mosques. Our interviews have shown that they show solidarity after mosque attacks and also offer exemplary assistance and support. However, such responses to attacks are not widespread.

To the investigating authorities

In principle, the work of the police forces is evaluated positively. However, there is still room for improvement in communication with the mosque communities. Here are a few examples: Especially on weekends, there are more people in the mosques than usual. Therefore, community boards should be notified of a threat in a timely and sufficient manner. In the case of a precarious threat situation, for example, it is not enough to position a patrol car in front of the mosque without informing the community about the background. We observed something similar in Hesse, for example, when the police authority increased its presence around a mosque “as a precautionary measure” and asked the community to keep its premises closed that day, even though it confirmed itself in an e-mail that there were no site-specific danger warnings. This can lead to the fear and uncertainty of the community and especially the children. There should be more initiative in contacting mosques in general.

Furthermore, it is important that the officers investigate in all directions. It still happens that the perpetrators are first sought within the mosque’s own ranks. A possible politically motivated act should not be ruled out at an early stage. This topic should already be considered in depth in the training of po-

lice personnel. It is advisable to include in the training concepts and fields such as racism and Islamophobia, among others, and to focus more on them.

Statements by officers that could help trivialize an attack should also be avoided. The mental state and affectedness of the community members should be considered. It might prove helpful to promote intercultural competencies within the authorities or to deploy more trained personnel.

It is also striking that a particularly large number of suspects (88%) could not be identified. According to statements by the chairmen of the mosque communities, it is not always comprehensible why the attackers cannot be identified despite video recordings from the attack and letters of confession. The communities assume that a low success rate in investigations could have a motivating effect on further attackers. This concern should be taken seriously. It is recommended to investigate the closer circumstances of this low success rate.

To media professionals

Media professionals should be particularly careful not to use anti-Muslim narratives in their reporting on Muslims or Islam, either in images or in language. Instead, the public or civil society could be made aware of the problem of anti-Muslim racism and more space could be given to mosque attacks. Therefore, mosque attacks should also find a place in major newspapers to reach the general public. This would possibly contrib-

ute to greater public condemnation and less relativization of mosque attacks. It would be helpful, for example, to allow those affected to speak more often.

Even though attacks on mosques are now being discussed in the press, the rate of press reports during the period of the study remained low: Slightly less than half of the mosque attacks were reported in the media. On the one hand, the media often only talks about attacks that have caused major damage to property or if brute force was used or threatened. On the other hand, attacks with comparatively little damage to property are ignored by the press. This is seen as problematic.

Attacks on mosques, regardless of the extent of the damage, are to be assessed as attacks on an entire community. Although the objects of such attacks are the buildings, they are often directed against the believers in the community or against their beliefs. Therefore, in addition to the object of the attack and the resulting property damage, the group of those affected should also be included in the assessment of the news value. Furthermore, with every attack, more attention should be paid to the fact that a lack of reporting means that the possible or even worsening development of the situation remains undetected.

The vast majority of the contacted community representatives indicated that they had been attacked in the past. Press reports can be an important source for monitoring the qualitative and quantitative developments in mosque attacks. It is therefore important that every attack finds its way into the press.

In addition, it is important that media interest in mosque attacks does not disappear after a few days. Our investigation has shown that, beyond the moment of the attack, the medium to long-term processing of mosque attacks includes aspects that are important in many respects. This includes, for example, the outcome of the investigations. If attackers are not caught or are not punished - according to some representatives of mosques - this affects the sense of security in the community. The press should therefore investigate the status of the investigation, even weeks after the attack.

It was also ascertained that mosque communities are often left alone when it comes to repairing damage to property or in problems with the insurance company. This is also a problem that the press could attract social attention to.

In some cases, representatives of the affected mosque communities have not proactively sought out the press. The exact reasons for this will be investigated in the future. The representatives of the mosque communities should report any attack to both the police and the media. There is also a need to raise the awareness in the mosque boards.

To the public and civil society

The public should take a closer look at the background of anti-Muslim racism and not be


swayed by right-wing and populist narratives. There is a lot of reporting about mosques at the moment. Unfortunately, often in a negative and very sweeping context. It is important to provide a differentiating perspective. The best way to do this is for civil society actors to visit mosques and try to get to know them better, rather than being influenced by sometimes generalized and tendentious reporting. The opportunity to draw on well-founded literature should also be taken up more.

Furthermore, high-profile actors are advised to show solidarity with communities affected by attacks and those affected by racism, and to take a firm stand against group-based misanthropy.

Visiting local mosque communities, especially after an attack, should become a matter of course. A strong society that stands behind communities and shows support and presence can help deter further attacks. Cohesion on hard days is an important sign for the affected mosque communities. Expressions of solidarity from neighbours, communities and associations give them the feeling that they are not forgotten and excluded but are part of society. This would also be a sign of diversity and tolerance in society. Moreover, it is precisely such reactions that will show the attackers that their goal of polarizing and creating conflict is not bearing fruit. Society altogether can actively contribute to this.

10. Photos





11. List of Abbreviations

ADÜTDF - Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist Associations in Germany

BA - Federal Criminal Police Office

DITIB - Turkish Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion

IGMG/Islamrat - Islamic Community Millî Görüş / Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany

KRM - Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany - This Council represents six religious communities and 2000 Mosques in Germany and was established in March 2007.

PKK - Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê). It is designated as a terrorist organization in several countries including the US, Turkey and EU.

PMK - Politically Motivated Crime

PYD - Democratic Union Party - According to its own statutes a Syrian branch of the PKK.

ZMD - Central Council of Muslims



#brandeilig is an initiative of the anti-discrimination association FAIR international.